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versely, at its readable best, although admittedly it does not paint a true
picture of the bulk of the federal judiciary.
JAMES G. FRANCE*
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. By
Robert M. Cover.' New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1975, Pp. xii, 322. $15.00.
Slavery in America has long been a subject of intense scrutiny by
historians.2  Indeed, several major interpretations of slavery have
appeared recently, enhancing our understanding of the complex work-
ings of the peculiar institution. Although the relationship between
slavery and the legal system has not been explored as fully as other
aspects of human bondage, contemporary scholarship has examined the
colonial origins of slavery,4 the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850,' and the personal liberty laws enacted by free states to hamper
the return of fugitives. 6  Similarly, legal historians have probed the
handling of slave crimes and private manumission proceedings before
state supreme courts. 7 Much, however, is left to be done. The treat-
* Professor of Law, University of Akron, Formerly Judge, Court of Appeals,
Seventh District, Ohio.
I. Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
2. E.g., U. PHLLIPS, AMERCiAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1918).
3. E.g., D. DAVIs, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1823 (1975); R. FOGEL & S. ENGERmAN, TnM ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF
AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974); E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
4. E.g., Alpert, The Origin of Slavery in the United States-The Maryland Prece-
dent, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1970).
5. E.g., S. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF =E FUGrrTVE
SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 (1970).
6. E.g., T. MoRusS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAws OF THm NORTH
1780-1861 (1974).
7. E.g., Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40
J. So. HIST. 537 (1974); Nash, A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and
the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N.C.L. REV. 197 (1970); Nash, Fairness
and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South,
56 VA. L. REV. 64 (1970).
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ment of slaves at the trial court level remains largely untouched,8 as
does the consideration of slavery in property, estate, commercial, and
tort lawY
Robert M. Cover's provocative study of the antislavery bench and bar
is a significant contribution to the growing literature in this field. The
author focuses primarily upon the intellectual dilemma of the antislav-
erly judge-one who would have accepted the "characterization of slav-
ery as oppression"'-as he was forced to decide between his private
conscience and the application of laws favoring the institution of
slavery. Recognizing that those judges particularly troubled by slavery
"represented but a small percentage of American judiciary," Cover
nonetheless argues that "their position was strategically important"
since they had a great impact on their fellow judges and the potential
to influence abolitionist opinion." The author maintains that "a
known, committed antislavery judge was in the best position to set an
example of role fidelity and to convincingly articulate the rationale for
law-abiding behavior." 2
Cover pays special attention to the views of Joseph Story'" and
Lemuel Shaw 4 of Massachusetts and John McLean'5 and Joseph
Swan 6 of Ohio. Despite their personal antipathy to slavery, each of
these judges felt compelled to render decisions upholding human bond-
age, and each came under increasingly hostile attack by antislavery for-
ces. Judge Swan paid an especially heavy price for his conception of
judicial duty. In 1859 he was denied renomination to the Ohio
Supreme Court because of his decision denying the state's power to
grant habeas corpus to the rescuers of a fugitive slave who were con-
victed under federal law.'
8. But see Edwards, Slave Justice in Four Middle Georgia Counties, 57 GA. HIsT.
Q. 265 (1973).
9. For a suggestive article, see Stealey, The Responsibilities and Liabilities of the
Bailee of Slave Labor in Virginia, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 336 (1968).
10. R. CovER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JuDICAL PROCESs 6 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ACCusED].
11. Id. at 237.
12. Id. at 225.
13. Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1811-1845.
14. Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1830-1860.
15. Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1829-1861.
16. Judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 1854-1858, Chief Justice, 1858-1859.
17. JUSTICE ACCusED 256. The case was Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
[Vol. 1975:262
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/20
Vol. 1975:262]
To establish the intellectual background for this judicial dilemma,
Cover considers at length the interplay between natural law and legal
positivism. Noting the persistent resort to natural law theories by anti-
slavery advocates, he points out that the very ambiguities of the concept
made it "a tool for expressing moral doubt and concern about slave
law"' 8 and "a device for expressing the gap between the law as it is
and the law as it ought to be."' 9  Under the influence of ideas ex-
pressed in the late 18th century by Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Lord
Mansfield, any possible justification for slavery based on natural law had
disappeared. On the other hand, these same authorities acknowledged
that, if sanctioned by positive law, slavery could rightfully exist. As
this deference to positive law suggests, natural law occupied a lesser
place in the judicial scale of values than constitutions, statutes, and
precedents. Moreover, the decades following the American Revolu-
tion saw many commentators reject natural law as a vehicle for the
formulation of social policy.20
For all its practical limitations, the natural law tradition indicated that
slavery was contrary to the inherent right to liberty. As Cover
observes: "To speak of slavery as against natural law, even if the legal
consequences of the statement were few and undramatic, was to admit
the moral blemish on the system."' 21  Yet the uses of natural law re-
mained obscure. Was natural law simply a sort of residual body of au-
thority, available only when other sources of law did not reach a given
situation? To what extent could it be used in the interpretation of acts
of positive law? Did natural law have any role when the positive
law unmistakably established slavery?
18. JUSTICE ACCUSED 9.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Cover's emphasis on the antislavery character of natural law is perhaps over-
drawn. Private property also was seen as a basic natural right, and this included the
right of masters to their slaves. In addition, the declining influence of natural law in
the post-Revolutionary period weakened its vitality as a force for emancipation. "As
time went on," Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out, "antislavery writers appealed to its
principles less directly and less often." W. JORDAN, WHBn OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATrITUaDES TowARD THE NEGRO 1550-1812, at 350 (1968). Still, the antislavery impli-
cations of natural law were unquestionably bothersome to defenders of the peculiar insti-
tution. See, e.g., T. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1858) (arguing slavery was in full accord with natural
law).
21. JUSTICE ACCUSED 35.
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Surveying a variety of slave cases in the period 1780 to 1840, Cover
concludes that judges adhered to judicial positivism and were disin-
clined to discuss the natural law rights of bondsmen. Litigation to de-
fine the meaning of the "free and equal" clauses of state constitutions,
to determine the scope of state emancipation acts and private manumis-
sions, and to apply conflict of laws principles and international law in
a slavery context all pointed to the triumph of positivism. Even the
celebrated Amistad case,22 one of the infrequent antislavery legal
victories, "reaffirmed the supremacy of positive law to natural right and
extended" this reasoning to include foreign municipal law. 23 Justice
Story's opinion freed the Africans who had seized control of a Spanish
ship, but was predicated on the fact that the Africans were illegally en-
slaved under Spanish law, which had prohibited Spanish participation
in the African slave trade. More important, Story seemingly limited
the slave's right of revolution to situations of illegal confinement and
denied this right when the law fostered slavery.
Aside from their commitment to positivism, antebellum judges were
acutely aware of self-imposed limits on judicial law making. The Jef-
fersonian and Jacksonian movements raised questions about the func-
tion of an undemocratic and independent branch of a supposedly repre-
sentative government. As a consequence of the bitter controversy over
federal common law crimes and the codification drive, both of which
challenged the discretionary character of common law adjudication,
judges came to conceive of their roles as "one of will-less, self-abnegat-
ing application of law."'24 While judges realized that they made law,
they were circumspect in the exercise of this power; the judicial ethic
prohibited the substitution of their individual convictions of right in dis-
regard of the law. This attitude served to contract the area in which
antislavery judges felt free to move against slavery.
After 1840, the discomfort of the antislavery judge was heightened
by the emergence of a small but active ideological bar dedicated to at-
tacking the legal underpinnings of slavery. Largely concerned with
fugitive slaves, the antislavery bar spurned compromise, pursued
apparently hopeless cases, and used the courtroom as a forum for politi-
cal and social criticism. As the arguments of the antislavery lawyers
22. United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
23. JUSTICE AccusED 109.
24. Id. at 147.
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grew more tenuous, many judges viewed such advocates as publicity
seekers anxious to delay proceedings, or even as threats to the rule of
law. In one of his most interesting chapters, Cover describes the
division of opinion among antislavery lawyers over the judicial function.
New England attorneys, under the influence of the Garrisonians and
Wendell Phillips, accepted the obligation of judges to apply positive law
in preference to natural law. Since the Garrisonians admitted that the
law did not permit a judge to apply his own version of justice to slavery,
they contended that the conscientious antislavery judge ought to resign.
Other antislavery counsel fashioned arguments that would permit
judges to use their power to free slaves. Asserting that express law
in conflict with natural law was invalid, such attorneys maintained "that
the judge ought to create a new judicial role in which he has the power
to resort to natural law."25
Neither theory, however, held much prospect for success. Resigna-
tion would underscore the moral purity of the jurist, but would do noth-
ing in the short run to aid individuals or curtail slavery. On the other
hand, efforts to formulate a new legal approach to slavery served to
tangle the bondage question with other legal issues. In addition, anti-
slavery counsel were glaringly inconsistent with respect to federalism.
The states' rights argument against the summary return of fugitives ran
directly counter to other abolitionist goals, such as federal control of
slavery in the territories and District of Columbia and use of the mails
for abolitionist propaganda, which necessitated a broad construction of
the federal constitution. Lastly, neither approach enlisted any support
among antebellum judges.
Confronted by this ideological advocacy and the sympathetic quali-
ties of the fugitives, "the antislavery judges consistently gravitated to
the formulations most conducive to a denial of personal responsibility
and most persuasive as to the importance of the formalism of the in-
stitutional structure for which they had opted."2 6 Specifically, the au-
thor outlines four justifications advanced by the judges for their fidelity
to the positive law of slavery: (1) ordered society depended upon ad-
herence to constitutional limits; (2) the separation of powers doctrine
lodged control over slavery elsewhere in the government structure; (3)
maintenance of the national union was at stake; and (4) their judicial
25. Id. at 125.
26. Id. at 229.
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oath bound them to support the Constitution. Although the antislavery
judges continued within their traditional roles, the author observes that
"this participation was often accompanied by protests that responsibility
lay elsewhere, by indications of distress, helplessness, and, indirectly,
guilt.
2 7
Despite its strengths, one cannot help feeling that the scope of this
work is unduly narrow. We learn much about the place of natural law
in antebellum adjudication and the thought processes of a small circle
of antislavery judges. Even here, however, the work is marred by
Cover's failure to treat the primary sources pertaining to these jurists.
Further, Cover does not explain why, in the end, natural law exercised
so little influence and the antislavery bar changed so few minds. Cur-
iously, the author gives only passing attention to the impact of natural
law upon southern judges who operated in a proslavery climate. Yet
a judge in a slave state would have had far greater opportunity to pass
upon the antislavery implications of natural law than a northern jurist.2"
Even more serious is the apparently artificial character of the central
problem-conscience versus the law. It is unclear on what basis Cover
selected Story, Shaw, McLean, and Swan for examination, but excluded
other judges opposed to slavery. Moreover, the degree of antislavery
commitment by several of these judges is suspect. While Justice Story
personally disliked slavery, biographers stress the ambiguity in his
approach to the peculiar institution and his sense of restraint.2" In
1842, Story wrote Senator John Berrien of Georgia to suggest the
appointment of federal commissioners to assist in the administration of
the fugitive slave laws. 30  This surely indicates that Story's antislavery
27. Id. at 208.
28. For example, in a contested testamentary manumission, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declared that "the laws under which he is held as a slave have not and cannot
extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him of many rights which are inherent in
man." Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 92, 96 (1846), discussed in A. Howington, "Not in the
condition of a horse or an ox": Ford v. Ford, the Law of Testamentary Manumission,
and the Tennessee Court's Recognition of Slave Humanity, 1974 (unpublished manu-
script in possession of this author at Vanderbilt School of Law). See also Nash, Negro
Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extra-
ordinary Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C.L. REv. 141 (1969).
29. See, e.g., G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 393-94 (1970); J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSrTTUION
297-99 (1971).
30. McCLELLAN, supra note 29, at 262-63 n.94. This portion of Story's letter to
Berrien was omitted from LIF AND Lurrns OF JOSEPH STORY (W. Story ed. 1851), a
work upon which Cover relies.
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feelings were rather tepid. Similarly, Cover offers no evidence that
Lemuel Shaw agonized deeply over his fugitive slave decisions. Leonard
Levy observed that Shaw left "the cause of individual freedom in anxious
regard for an even greater value, the nation itself."'" How did Story or
Shaw differ from Benjamin R. Curtis,32 whom Cover classes as a conser-
vative unionist? Arguably, then, neither Story nor Shaw really fit the
author's preconceived model. To this extent the hypothesis upon which
the entire volume is based begins to crumble.
The book ignores a whole range of other factors, such as educational
background and political affiliation, that might influence the outcome
of slavery cases to a greater extent than an abstract philosophical com-
mitment to antislavery. Did John McLean's presidential ambitions dic-
tate his position on fugitive cases? He was, after all, the conservative
favorite at the Republican Convention of 1856, pledged to respect the
rights of the slave states. 3
Also bothersome is the author's treatment of the method of reasoning
employed by the antislavery judges. Disagreeing with the prevailing
interpretation of antebellum judicial style, Cover contends that in slav-
ery cases judges adopted a mechanistic formalism in their opinions.
"Thus, in slavery," he asserts, "the 1840's and 1850's were not a golden
age of free-wheeling policy jurisprudence, but an age of the retreat to
formalism."3 4 For example, Cover claims that Justice Shaw used a dif-
ferent method of analysis in slavery litigation than in torts, labor, or
criminal cases: a marked reluctance to become involved and a heavy
reliance on precedent.35  To the antislavery judges, the author con-
cludes, "it was important that they hide the extent of their decisional
power from themselves. 36
In this conclusion, Cover takes partial issue with Karl Llewellyn'
and Morton Horwitz,3 who have suggested that antebellum judges de-
31. L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 108
(1957).
32. Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 1851-1857.
33. See F. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 146-51 (1937).
34. JUSICE ACCUSED 200.
35. Id. at 251. Cover draws heavily upon LEVY, supra note 31.
36. JUSTICE ACCUSED 235.
37. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIoN: DEcmING APPEA.s 36-38,
62-72 (1960).
38. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
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veloped an instrumental conception of law as a conscious means to at-
tain socially desirable ends. Although Llewellyn and Horwitz drew
most of their examples from commercial law, Cover's assessment is also
at variance with William E. Nelson's recent study of the conflict
between instrumentalism and antislavery jurisprudence. Seeing the
major slavery decisions as an outgrowth of the instrumentalist tradition,
Nelson writes:
The fact, however, is that the advocates of compromise with slavery
rested their case upon instrumentalist arguments about what was politi-
cally wise and economically expedient, whereas opponents of slavery
made essentially moralistic arguments about the law of God and the
rights of man. At least in the courts, the conflict between slavery and
antislavery was not a struggle for political power, but also a conflict be-
tween men possessing differing views about the proper role of law and
government-between men who believed that courts should explicitly
pursue socially expedient policy goals and men who believed that courts
should decide cases consistently with standards of what, in some ultimate
sense, was right and wrong.39
The difference between Cover and Nelson can be illustrated by their
handling of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,4" in which the Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. To Cover,
Prigg "appears to be a formidable example of a highly formalistic abdi-
cation of the responsibility to weigh and consider policy and moral im-
plications of constitutional law .... ',4' Nelson, however, maintains
that Prigg "rested on an instrumentalist concern for national unity
"42
Part of the difficulty with Cover's analysis lies in his treatment of the
reasons advanced by antislavery judges in support of their decisions.
National unity, public order, and the integrity of the judicial process
were surely important values that even antislavery jurists could well have
prized more dearly than freedom for bondsmen. Although Cover ad-
mits the force of these competing values, he is clearly unimpressed and
1780-1820, in 5 PERSPEIVES iN AMERICAN HISTORY 285 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds.
1971).
39. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Rea-
soning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HRv. L. REv. 513, 543-44 (1974).
40. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
41. JUSTxCE ACCUSED 240.
42. Nelson, supra note 39, at 539.
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treats such arguments as a formula for judicial evasion. Furthermore,
the institution of slavery was never on trial before any of these judges.
At most their decisions could have affected a handful of runaways. An
antislavery judge steeped in instrumentalist thinking understandably
might decide that such a minimal impact on slavery was not worth the
price of the sectional animosity that was sure to follow a judicial blow
against the fugitive slave law.43
The author's handling of the battle over federal common law crimes
is imprecise. Cover first asserts:
The common law character of the federal court was an issue, . . . not
so much out of hostility to judicial lawmaking as out of hostility to ag-
grandizement of the national government at the expense of the states.44
But a few lines later we are told that the Jeffersonians attacked federal
common law crimes "because they understood that common law juris-
diction is a form of legislative power . . . .- It was this very recog-
nition of the potential for judicial law-making that caused judges to deny
personal preference as a legitimate basis for adjudication.
In addition to its consideration of the crucible of slavery and the law,
Cover's work has broad implications for contemporary legal practice.
The limitations of ideological antislavery advocacy become evident,
and perhaps foreshadow similar problems with the self-styled radical
lawyers of the 1960's.46 The quandary of a judge called upon to imple-
ment laws that he disdains is, of course, still with us. Nevertheless,
we derive no guidance from Cover about the resolution of this dilemma.
Natural law and appeals to higher justice, with their vague boundaries
and heavy subjectivity, are hardly meaningful alternatives to positive
law. Even now, judicial law-making, especially in the constitutional
area, remains a sensitive subject. In his sometimes wordy and repiti-
tious efforts to probe judicial "collaboration in a system of oppres-
43. The outcry which greeted the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), would seem to indicate the wisdom of a low judi-
cial profile on slavery questions.
44. JusTicE ACCUSED 140.
45. Id. at 141.
46. See, e.g., J. BIsHOP, William Kunstler and the New Bar, in OBrran DIcTA 3
(1971).
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sion,"47 the author poses some difficult questions, but attempts no
answers.
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
47. Jus'rcE ACCUSED 6.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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